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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to 
§78-2-2(3) (j) of Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court rule correctly in deciding that 
stacking of uninsured motorist benefits was not allowed in Utah? 
2. Did the district court rule correctly in deciding that 
plaintiff's recovery was subject to the "each person" limit on 
coverage and not the "each accident" limit? 
3. Did the district court rule correctly in deciding that 
prejudgment interest on personal injury damages under U. C.A. 
§15-1-1(2) are not recoverable? 
4. Did the district court rule correctly in deciding that 
prejudgment interest on special damages, U.C.A. §78-27-44 cannot 
be recovered over and above the policy limit. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on the district court's disposition 
of an issue by summary judgment is a determination of whether 
there is any genuine issue of material fact. If not, the 
district court's ruling is reviewed under a correctness standard 
to determine if the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Graco Fishing v. Ironwood Exploration, 766 P.2d 
1074 (Utah 1988). 
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STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1: 
15-1-1. Interest rates -- contracted rate -
- Legal rate. 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract 
may agree upon any rate of interest for the 
loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or 
chose in action that is the subject of their 
contract. 
( 2) Unless parties to a lawful con-
tract specify a different rate of interest, 
the legal rate of interest for the loan of 
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in 
action shall be 10% per annum. 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305(6): 
(6) In no event shall the limit of 
liability for uninsured motoris·t coverage 
for two or more motor vehicles be added 
together, combined, or stacked to determine 
the limit of insurance coverage available to 
an injured person for any one accident. If 
uninsured motorist coverage is available to 
an injured person under more than one 
insurance policy, the injured person shall 
elect the policy under which he desires to 
collect uninsured motorist benefits. 
Claimants are not barred against making 
subsequent elections if recovery is 
unavailable under previous elections. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-44: 
78-27-44. Personal injury judgments --
Interest authorized 
In all actions brought to recover 
damages for personal injuries sustained by 
any person, resulting from or occasioned by 
the tort of any other person, corporation, 
association or partnership, whether by 
negligence or willful intent of that other 
person, corporation, association or partner-
ship, and whether that injury shall have 
resulted fatally or otherwise, it shall be 
lawful for the plaintiff in the complaint to 
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claim interest on the special damages 
alleged from the date of the occurrence of 
the act giving rise to the cause of action 
and it shall be the duty of the court, in 
entering judgment for plaintiff in that 
action, to add to the amount of damages 
assessed by the verdict of the jury, or 
found by the court, interest on that amount 
calculated at 8% per annum from the date of 
the occurrence of the act giving rise to the 
cause of action to the date of entering the 
judgment, and to include it in that 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor 
of defendant Metropolitan by the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance 
Company (Metropolitan) has no dispute with the facts as outlined 
by plaintiff and appellant Nielsen with two exceptions. Those 
exceptions are that Nielsen could not have expected to be covered 
by both policies of UM coverage for the one accident. Rather, it 
was clear that Nielsen's expectation was for the one limit or 
$250, 000 to apply 1 not $500, 000 or $1,000 1 000 he now claims. 
(Barbara Maw Affidavit) 
Further, the insurance policy on the 1977 Buick was not at 
issue nor was it discussed in the underlying action. In fact, it 
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arose for the first time after the jury verdict on plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Nielsen maintains he is entitled to "stack" his two separate 
uninsured motorist coverage limits based on the argument that he 
has paid two separate premiums. However, under Utah law inter-
preting Metropolitan 1 s "anti-stacking" provision, he is precluded 
from doing so. In support of his position Nielsen cites one Utah 
case, unreported, which allowed "stacking" but in doing so, made 
a distinction in situations where the limiting provision was 
ambiguous. 
policy. 
This was clearly not the case with Metropolitan's 
Rather, case law holds that the language in 
Metropolitan's policy is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, its 
"anti-stacking" provision should be upheld .. 
Metropolitan's policy language is clear and unambiguous as 
to whether the "each person" or 11 each accident" limit applies. 
As a matter of law, Nielsen is entitled to the $250, 000 "per 
person" limit and not the $500,000 limit for "each accident" on 
the policy insuring the particular vehicle involved in the acci-
dent only. The policy provision governing the limits of liabil-
ity is clear on its face. Further, Metropolitan maintains that 
in the course of negotiating settlement and pursuing this matter 
for trial and in fact even in instructing the jury, the policy 
limit of $250,000 was always understood to be the maximum limit 
and this was never in dispute. It follows then, that Nielsen is 
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now precluded from raising an issue as to whether the limit is 
actually $500, 000 or $1, 000,000 and for this reason as well, 
Metropolitan maintains that the $250,000 "per person" limit is 
the appropriate limit and not the $500,000 "per accident" or the 
$1,000,000 obtained by stacking the two separate policies. 
Nielsen is not entitled to the 10% prejudgment interest 
prescribed by U.C.A. §15-1-1 on his damages since this is a 
personal injury action. 
Finally, Nielsen's argument he is entitled to prejudgment 
interest on special damages (§78-27-44 U.C.A.) is moot in that 
Metropolitan has paid its applicable policy limit of $250,000, 
the amount understood by both parties in the course of negotia-
tions and at trial to be the maximum policy limit. Prejudgment 
interest on special damages is considered part of compensatory 
damages and cannot be recovered in excess of the policy limit. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
STACKING UNINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS IS NOT 
ALLOWED IN UTAH IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER 
SEPARATE PREMIUMS ARE PAID ON TWO DIFFERENT 
VEHICLES. 
Nielsen maintains that he is entitled to the uninsured 
motorist benefits applicable to both vehicles listed in the 
policy issued to him by Metropolitan (a 1970 Buick Skylark and 
1977 Pontiac Grand Pre) . Nielsen argues that he should be 
allowed to "stack" the uninsured motorist coverage on the two 
separate vehicles because he had "a reasonable expectation" that 
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he would be entitled to such coverage, public policy dictates he 
is entitled to such coverage and ambiguities in the insurance 
contract inure to his benefit and entitle him to such coverage. 
The basis for claiming such entitlements is that Nielsen was 
charged separate premiums for the two vehicles listed in this 
policy and is therefore entitled to the uninsured motorist 
benefits from both vehicles. 
A. "Reasonable Expectations". 
Nielsen maintains that the relevant provisions in the 
insurance contract are ambiguous and create a "reasonable 
expectation" that he should be allowed to "stack" the uninsured 
motorist coverage on the two separate vehicles. The basis for 
this contention is the payment of separate premiums and the 
expectation that separate premiums give rise to greater coverage. 
However no such ambiguity exists. Rather, it is 
Metropolitan's position that its policy clearly states that there 
can be no "stacking"; any other interpretation would be contrary 
to the clear policy language. 
The relevant portions of the Metropolitan policy provide: 
5. OTHER AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND 
METROPOLITAN. 
With respect to any occurrence, acci-
dent or loss to which this and any other 
automobile insurance policy issued to the 
named insured by METROPOLITAN also applies, 
the total limit of METROPOLITAN'S liability 
under all such policies shall not exceed the 
highest applicable limit of liability or 
benefit amount under any one such policy. 
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Martin v. Christensen, 454 P.2d 294 (Utah 1969), a Utah case 
contains a similar policy provision and interpreted it to 
preclude "stacking". In Martin, a husband and wife suffered 
injuries when struck as pedestrians by an uninsured motorist. 
The insurance company had issued two automobile policies to the 
family. The applicable limit for each policy was $20,000. The 
insureds claim they were entitled to $40,000 or the sum of the 
limit of both policies. Each policy provided that where the 
company had issued more than one policy to an insured, it would 
be liable only up to the maximum coverage of its highest limit on 
any one policy. Each policy contained the following limiting 
provision: 
With respect to any occurrence, accident or 
loss to which this and any other insurance 
policy or policies issued to the insured by 
the company also apply, no payment shall be 
made hereunder which, when added to any 
amount paid or payable under such other 
insurance policy or policies, would result 
in the total payment to the insured or any 
other person in excess of the highest appli-
cable limit of liability under any one such 
policy. Id. at 295. 
The plaintiffs maintained that "stacking" of uninsured 
motorist benefits should be allowed despite the language of the 
above-mentioned provision for two reasons. First, plaintiff 
argues that defendant insurer should be deemed to have waived the 
limiting provision since it issued a second policy and accepted 
payment of a "separate" premium for such. Second, plaintiff 
argues that since the Insurance Code required automobile policies 
7 
to have uninsured motorist limits of not less than $10,000 per 
person and $20,000 er accident, they should therefore be 
entitled to the maximum limits under both policies. Id. at 
295-296. 
Upon reciprocal motions for summary judgment, the trial 
court ruled in favor of the defendant insurer, holding that the 
uninsured motorist benefits could not be "stacked." on appeal, 
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, and, 
after quoting the above-mentioned limiting provision in the 
policy, held as follows: 
There appears to be no ambiguity or un-
certainty in the provision just quoted it 
being thus set forth as part of the insur-
ance contract, in clear and understandable 
terms, that where the company has issued 
more than one policy to an insured, it will 
be liable only up to the maximum coverage 
of its highest limit on any one policy for 
any one accident or loss, it is the duty of 
the courts to give it effect. . . . 
•.. It is the company's position that said 
paragraph 7 under scrutiny here was 
expressly designed to provide that coverage 
under one policy and to avoid the effect of 
cumulative or multiple limits on a single 
accident where an insured has more than one 
policy; and further, that its premiums are 
based on the total exposure of risk on the 
entire policy as written, including the 
limitations in paragraph 7. This impresses 
us as reasonable and as providing the answer 
to plaintiff's other contention that by 
acceptance of the premium on the second 
policy that defendant should be deemed to 
have waived the limitation in question. 
On the basis of what we have said above 
it is our conclusion that the trial court 
was correct in its ruling that the defendant 
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company was liable only for the one maximum 
coverage of $20,000 as provided for in the 
policies. Id. at 295-296. 
Thus, in Martin, the Utah Supreme Court in interpreting the 
limiting provision rejected arguments in support of "stacking" 
uninsured motorist benefits, including an argument concerning 
"separate premium" payments which is the argument being made by 
Nielsen in the present case. Therefore, although other 
jurisdictions may have established law and public policy in favor 
of "stacking" uninsured motorist benefits, the Utah Supreme Court 
clearly adopted a position to the contrary, as expressed in 
Martin, and has never subsequently altered that position or 
indicated any intent to do so. Instead, the Utah Supreme Court • s 
position against allowing an insured to "stack" uninsured 
motorist benefits under any situation has now been adopted by the 
legislature in the "anti-stacking" statute found in Utah Code 
Annotated §31A-22-305(6) (1985). 
It is clear that Metropolitan's policy rejects "stacking". 
Any other interpretation is contrary to the clear and unambiguous 
language of the policy. Other Utah cases holding separate policy 
limits cannot be "stacked" include Russell v. Poulson, 417 P.2d 
658 (Utah 1966); and Lyon v. Hartford Accid. & Ins. Co., 480 P.2d 
739 (Utah 1971). 
The cases relied on by Nielsen are cases from other 
jurisdictions (Mississippi, Alabama and New Mexico) and conflict 
with Utah case law, with the exception of Ainge v. Allstate, 
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United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central 
Division, Civil No. C-80-211A, an unreported opin on written by 
Judge Aldon J. Anderson in 1981. 
In Ainge v. Allstate Ins. Co., plaintiff was injured by an 
uninsured motorist. Allstate Insurance Company provided coverage 
to four vehicles and plaintiff paid a separate premium for 
uninsured motorist protection under each policy. The Allstate 
policies contained a limiting clause. The court held that the 
clause was ambiguous and should be construed against the insurer. 
Judge Anderson in Ainge ruled in favor of plaintiff, allowing him 
to "stack" the policies. 
The clause contained in the Ainge case is not similar to the 
clause contained in Metropolitan's policy. Rather, the more 
similar clause to Metropolitan's is that found in the Martin 
case. The Ainge court also distinguished Martin, finding that 
the limiting clause in Martin was not ambiguous. In making this 
distinction, the Ainge court held that, "Where a limiting 
provision is 'clear and understandable' it will be upheld unless 
considerations of justice and equity or public policy militate to 
the contrary. The Ainge court also pointed out that the Martin 
case was distinguishable from the Ainge case because of the 
clarity of the limiting provisions therein. Noteworthy is that 
the district court also indicated that the Utah Supreme court had 
never had an opportunity to consider the inequity involved in the 
situation where an insured pays a separate premium for separate 
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policies, but does not get the full benefit of separate uninsured 
motorist coverages because of limiting clauses placed in the 
policy. In this regard, the Ainqe court felt that the Utah 
Supreme Court would rule that such a limiting clause is void as 
against public policy and allowed "stacking" of the four 
policies. For this reason, the district court held that 
plaintiff could recover up to the maximum limit under each policy 
to the extent of his damages. 
Judge Anderson's prediction that stacking of uninsured 
motorist benefits would be allowed in Utah proved fallacious. 
This was evident by the Utah legislature's adoption of U.C.A. 
§JlA-22-305(6) in 1985. The statute makes clear that "stacking" 
is not permitted and against public policy. Specifically, 
§JlA-22-305(6) U.C.A. states that: 
In no event shall the limit of liability for 
uninsured motorist coverage for two or more 
motor vehicles be added together, combined 
or stacked to determine the limit of insur-
ance coverage available to an injured person 
for any one accident. If uninsured motorist 
coverage is available to an injured person 
under more than one insurance policy, the 
injured person shall elect the policy under 
which he desires to collect uninsured 
motorist benefits. Claimants are not barred 
against making subsequent elections if 
recovery is unavailable under previous 
elections. 
Further, Metropolitan acknowledges this statute was passed after 
the accident occurred and therefore not controlling. However, 
Metropolitan assumes that the court will not take a stance in 
contravention with the legislature. The basis for this assump-
11 
tion is found in Whitehead v. American Motors Sale Corp., 801 
P. 2d 920 (Utah 1990), wherein the court found under similar 
circumstances that: 
Although this statute was passed subsequent 
to the litigation sub judice and was there-
fore not controlling at trial, we nonethe-
less decline to place ourselves in the 
awkward position of adopting a stance that 
is in direct contravention of express 
legislation. Id. 928. 
It is important to note that the limiting provision which 
the Utah Supreme court found to be clear and unambiguous in 
Martin is virtually identical to the provision found in the 
Metropolitan policy issued to Nielsen in the present case. ~ 
in Martin, the Utah Supreme Court rejected arguments in support 
of "stacking" uninsured motorist benefits, including an argument 
concerning "separate premium" payments which is the argument 
being made by plaintiff in the present case.. Therefore, although 
other jurisdictions may have established law and public policy in 
favor of "stacking" of uninsured motorist benefits when separate 
premiums have been paid for multiple vehicles or policies, the 
Utah Supreme Court clearly adopted a position to the contrary, as 
expressed in Martin, and as affirmed by Judge Aldon Anderson in 
his unpublished opinion in Ainge v. Allstate, in which he distin-
guished ambiguous from unambiguous clauses, and has never subse-
quently altered that position or indicated any intent to do so. 
Instead, the Utah Supreme Court's position against allowing an 
insured to "stack" uninsured motorist benefits under any situ-
12 
ation has now been codified by the legislature and the above-
quoted anti-stacking statute found in Utah Code Annotated 
§31A-2-305(6) (1985). 
It follows then that under the terms of the policy issued to 
Nielsen by Metropolitan and according to the controlling law in 
Utah, "stacking" is prohibited and Nielsen's "reasonable expecta-
tion" is only for a single policy limit for uninsured motorist 
coverage. 
In addition, Nielsen refers to his affidavit in which he 
testified he had such an "expectation." Interestingly, Nielsen 
did not become aware of this "expectation" until after the matter 
was tried and a verdict reached. In fact all through negotia-
tions and the time of instructing the jury as to the policy 
limits (the jury was instructed that the maximum policy limit on 
the Metropolitan policy was $250,000), Nielsen's only "expecta-
tion" was for the $250,000 policy limit. (See Objection to Entry 
of Judgment R. 3, lines 11-14; R. 5, lines 7-17 and R. 6, lines 
9-15; Motion in Limine, R. 11, lines 5-10; R. 15, lines 9-13; 
Plaintiff's Counsel's Opening and Closing Argument, R. 30, lines 
19-21; Jury Instruction No. 2, Court's Pleading File, R. 248). 
B. Public Policy. 
Nielsen's public policy argument with regard to limiting 
clauses in insurance policies, specifically the Metropolitan 
exclusion with respect to "stacking," is without merit. 
Metropolitan maintains its policy contains a provision which 
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precludes "stacking." Nielsen argues that if in fact 
Metropolitan doe"'- have such an exclusion which is clear and 
unambiguous on its face, it still must be stricken for public 
policy reasons. In support of this contention Nielsen cites 
Ainge v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, wherein the court concludes 
that "public policy does not permit the inequity involved where 
an insurance company holds out certain coverage, charges a 
premium for that coverage, and then by a limiting clause makes it 
impossible to recover on more than one of the premiums paid." 
Id. 6. Nielsen's reliance on this case for the general 
proposition that public policy prohibits insurance policy 
limitations in uninsured motorist coverage cases is misplaced. 
Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 786 P.2d 763 (Utah App. 
1990), makes clear that exclusions are permissible. In reaching 
this decision the Wagner court found that, "An insurer may limit 
its obligation to provide coverage by 'exclusions' phrased in 
language which clearly and unmistakably communicates to the 
insured the specific circumstance under which the expected 
coverage will not be provided." Id. 765. Martin v. Christensen 
established that Metropolitan's policy was clear and unambiguous 
in providing that if the company had issued more than one policy 
to the insured, the insurer would be liable only up to the 
maximum coverage of its highest limit of any one policy for any 
one accident or loss, but in no event does paying two premiums 
entitle the policyholder to apply the UM coverage of both 
14 
policies. (See Argument, Section (a) "reasonable expectations") 
It follows then that the automobile stacking exclusion under the 
Metropolitan policy is clearly stated and therefore, under 
Wagner, not void as against public policy. 
c. contract Interpretation. 
General principles of construction are followed when inter-
preting insurance agreements and include the following: 
1. "[I]n the absence of ambiguity, we interpret the terms 
of an insurance policy according to their plain meaning." 
(Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 786 P.2d 763 (Utah App. 1990), 
and cases cited therein; 13 Appleman Insurance Law & Practice, 
§7384 (1943)). 
2. "A cardinal rule in construing the contract is to give 
effect to the intentions of the parties and, if possible, these 
intentions should be gleaned from an examination of the text of 
the contract itself." (Wagner, supra, and L.D.S. Hospital v. 
Capital Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857 (Utah 1988)). 
3. The courts will not rewrite the terms of a policy but 
rather "leave any plugging of a (sic) loophole to the discretion 
of either the free market or legislature." (Wagner, supra). 
4. "Where an ambiguity appears in terms of a policy, 
especially in an exclusion from coverage, we examine the language 
from the viewpoint of the average purchaser of insurance who is 
not trained in law or in the insurance business. " 
supra). 
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(Wagner, 
5. "Any ambiguity in an insurance policy is construed 
against the insurer and in favor of coverage." (Wagner, supra, 
and L.D.S. Hospital, supra.) 
In evaluating the clauses in insurance contracts, the 
aforementioned principles apply. With respect to the case at 
issue, it is clear since there was no ambiguity (Section A, 
Reasonable Expectations, and Section B, Public Policy) that the 
terms of the insurance contract would be accorded their plain 
meaning. The policy provision previously cited, Section 5. 
Other Automobile Insurance and Metropolitan is clearly an "anti-
stacking" provision and would be clear to any lay person in 
providing that if there is more than one Metropolitan policy, the 
policy with the highest limit is the applicable one. 
Nielsen 1 s argument that he intended that paying the two 
separate premiums would result in both policies applying is 
unfounded. In the course of negotiating settlement with Nielsen 
over almost seven years, at no time when the policy limit was 
referred to was any figure given, other than $250,000. (Barbara 
Maw Aff ida vi t) . Further, there was no mention of any other 
policy limit other than $250,000 limit up until and through the 
trial, and in fact, the jury was instructed that the maximum 
policy limit on the Metropolitan policy for uninsured motorist 
coverage was $250,000. It wasn 1 t until the jury reached a 
verdict and a judgment was entered that Nielsen came forward and 
insisted that it was his understanding that he could in essence 
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"stack" the policies. Clearly, had Nielsen intended that 
"stacking" would apply, Nielsen would have made this an issue 
long before the verdict was entered. (Objection to Entry of 
Judgment, R. 3, lines 11-14, R. 5, lines 7-17 and R. 6, lines 
9-15; Motion in Limine, R. 11, lines 5-10, R. 15, lines 9-13; 
Plaintiff's Counsel's Opening and Closing Argument, R. 30, lines 
19-21; Jury Instruction No. 2, Court's Pleading File R. 248). 
Since there is no ambiguity with regard to the Metropolitan 
policy, the remaining criteria need not be discussed. Suffice it 
to say, Nielsen did not claim either "stacking" the coverage or 
that paying two premiums would "kick in" the uninsured motorist 
coverage from both policies until some time after trial when the 
verdict came in in excess of the $250,000 maximum limit Nielsen 
understood the policy limit to be. When confronted with a 
verdict in excess of that policy limit, Nielsen then tried to 
find other means to satisfy that judgment and hence attempted to 
"stack" the policies alleging that it was his understanding by 
paying two premiums he would be entitled to two policy limits. 
For all the aforementioned reasons, there is no "reasonable 
expectation," no public policy reason and no contractual inter-
pretation which would preclude the enforcement of the limiting or 
exclusion provision which in essence is an anti-stacking pro-
vision in the Metropolitan policy. For this reason, it is clear 
that the paying of two premiums does not give the Nielsen the 
right to two coverages. 
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II. 
PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY UNDER THE UNINSURED 
MOTORIST PROVISION OF METROPOLITAN'S POLICY 
IS SUBJECT TO THE "EACH PERSON" LIMIT ON 
SUCH COVERAGE, NOT THE "EACH ACCIDENT". 
Nielsen maintains that he is entitled to recover under the 
"each accident" limit for uninsured motorist coverage arguing 
that the limiting provision is ambiguous and thus should be 
construed in a light most favorable to the insured. However, 
Nielsen cites no case law containing the same or similar language 
where a court has found that language to be ambiguous. In fact, 
the only cases cited by Nielsen in connection with his argument 
are cases wherein the courts upheld similar language as being 
unambiguous and enforceable. 
The limiting provision in the Metropolitan policy applicable 
to uninsured motorist coverage states, in the pertinent part, as 
follows: 
The limit for Protection Against Uninsured 
Motorist Coverage stated in the Declarations 
as applicable to "each person" is the limit 
of METROPOLITAN's liability for all damages, 
arising out of bodily iniury sustained by 
one person in any one accident, and subject 
to this provision, the limit of liability 
stated in the Declarations as applicable to 
"each accident" is the total limit of 
METROPOLITAN 1 s liability for all such 
Damages for Bodily Injury sustained by two 
or more persons in any one accident. 
(Emphasis added) . 
Nielsen claims the above clause is ambiguous, with regard to 
the limits of liability because there is no explanation of what 
is meant by "subject to this provision." However, Nielsen is 
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attempting to create an ambiguity where one doesn't exist. As 
the sentence is structured, there is no need for an explanation 
of what is meant by "subject to this provision." The sentence 
clearly consists of two separate clauses or provisions, the first 
dealing with the limit applicable to "each person," and the 
second dealing with the limit applicable to "each accident." The 
two clauses or provisions are separated by the phrase, "subject 
to this provision," set off by commas. The only plain and 
reasonable interpretation of that sentence, or any similarly 
structured sentence in the English language, is to understand 
that the language of the second clause or provision is subject to 
the language of the first clause or provision in the sentence. 
There is no valid reason for any person to believe that the 
"subject to" language is referring to any other provision, since 
the phrase refers to "this provision" and is preceded by no 
provisions other than the provision mentioning the limit applic-
able to "each person." 
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ostenson, 713 P.2d 733 (Wash. 1986}, 
passengers in a car involved in a two-car accident filed claims 
for underinsured motorist coverage against the driver's insurer. 
The insurer filed an interpleader action, deposited $50,000 in 
the court registry, and was dismissed from the lawsuit. The 
trial court ordered distribution of the interpleaded underinsured 
motorist policy fund without regard to the policy's "per person" 
limitations, and plaintiffs appealed. The policy provided under-
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insured motorist coverage of $25,000 "per person" and $50, ooo 
"per accident". On appeal, the issue was whether the trial court 
erred in determining that the interpleaded underinsured motorist 
policy fund could be distributed among the three claimants with-
out regard to the policy's "per person" limitation. In holding 
that the "per person" limitation applied, the Supreme Court of 
Washington held that a limitation provision, containing a 
"subject to" clause substantially similar to the one at issue in 
the instant case was unambiguous and stated that: "To ignore 
this language would result in judicial remodeling of the 
contract." Id. at 735 (citations omitted). 
Further, in Standard Accident Ins. Co. of Detroit, Michigan 
v. Winget, 197 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952), two passengers riding in 
the automobile driven by the Standard insured were injured when 
the insured automobile became involved in an accident. The two 
passengers sued the insured driver, and each obtained a judgment 
in the amount of $32,000 and $15,000, respectively. The 
insured's policy had a limitation provision limiting recovery to 
$10,000 for "each person" and $20,000 for "each accident". The 
dispute was between the two injured claimants as to whether the 
"each person" limit of $10,000 should be ignored so that they 
would share the $20,000 "each accident" limit on a pro rata basis 
according to the amount of their separate judgments obtained 
against the insured. The limitation provision at issue consisted 
of the following language: 
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. . . The limit of bodily injury liability 
stated in the declarations as applicable to 
each person is the limit of the company's 
liability for all damages, including damages 
for care and loss of services, arising out 
of bodily injury, including death at any 
time resulting therefrom, sustained by one 
person in any one accident, the limit of 
such liability stated in the declarations as 
applicable to each accident is subject to 
the above provision respecting each person, 
the total limit of the company's liability 
for all damages, including damages for care 
and loss of services, arising out of bodily 
injury, including death at any time result-
ing therefrom, sustained by two or more 
persons in any one accident." Id. at 104, 
note 2 (emphasis added). 
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of 
California, Central Division, rendered a judgment wherein the 
court applied the "each person" limit of $10,000 without regard 
to the amount of each injured claimants judgment against the 
insured in excess of the $10, 0 0 0 1 imi t. In affirming the 
District Court's interpretation of the policy's limitation pro-
vision, the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit 
held as follows: 
The policy does not create a fund of 
$20,000.00 to be distributed proratedly to 
various persons according to the amount 
recovered. On the contrary, the policy, 
read in its entirety, shows distinctly that 
the limit is $10,000.00 for "each person" .. 
They (the limiting provisions) clearly 
limit recovery of each person to $10,000.00. 
This interpretation accords with logic and 
good sense. Otherwise, in the case of 
multiple 1nJuries, the insurance company 
would not be in a position to determine its 
liability or settle with one of the claim-
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ants until recovery has been had by all the 
persons injured. 
We are bidden to construe contracts, even 
contracts of insurance, reasonably. Words 
are to be construed in the sense in which 
they are ordinarily used. And the only 
reasonable interpretation is to take the 
words of the policy which limit liability 
for "each person" to $10,000.00 to mean what 
they say. Where the recovery exceeds that 
amount, the liability still remains 
$10,000.00 for "each person". If, as 
happened here, the insurer settled one of 
the claims for less than that amount, the 
benefit should go to it, not to Winget (the 
injured claimant), who, had she been the 
sole person injured, could not have 
recovered more than $10,000.00. Id. at 
103-105 (Citations omitted). 
The limitation provision at issue in Winget contained a 
"subject to" clause virtually identical to the one contained in 
the limitation provision at issue in the instant case. Although 
plaintiff has attempted to create some sort of ambiguity by 
merely claiming that the limitation provision contained in 
Metropolitan's policy is "undeniably confusing and difficult to 
comprehend", it should be noted that plaintiff has failed to 
point out any case law or other authority where such language has 
been held to be ambiguous. On the other hand, Metropolitan is 
able to point to at least two cases where the courts have held a 
limiting provision, containing a virtually :identical "subject to" 
clause, to be unambiguous and enforceable so as to only allow the 
claimants under the policy an amount limited by the "each person" 
limitation. Therefore, the court should interpret the limitation 
provision contained in Metropolitan's policy according to its own 
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plain language, 
limitation of 
$250,000. 
which clearly subjects the "each accident" 
$500,000 to the "each person" limitation of 
In other words, when Nielsen and his son were injured in the 
automobile accident in this case, they did have a total of 
$500, 000 available for their recovery. However, according to the 
plain language of the policy, that $500,000 limit consisted of a 
$250,000 limit available to Nielsen's son for injuries he sus-
tained, and $250,000 available for Nielsen for the injuries he 
sustained. No where in the policy does it imply that Nielsen 
would be able to utilize for his own use any part of the $250,000 
available for his son's injuries. Rather, the policy is clear on 
its face, Nielsen is entitled to receive up to $250,000. 
Similarly, his son is entitled to receive up to $250,000. 
Nowhere does the Metropolitan policy state that Nielsen is 
entitled to receive the "per accident" amount. 
In addition, it is important to note that, prior to the time 
that the jury verdict was reached in this case, Nielsen never 
claimed a right to nor demanded more than the single $250,000 UM 
coverage limit. In fact, there were several occasions prior to 
the jury verdict in this case where Nielsen, through counsel, 
expressed his belief that Metropolitan's limit for the uninsured 
motorist coverage applicable to Nielsen in this case was 
$250,000. (Objection to Entry of Judgment, R. 3, lines 11-14, 
R. 5, lines 7-17 and R. 6, lines 9-15; Motion in Limine, R. 11, 
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lines 5-10, R. 15, lines 9-13; Plaintiff's Counsel's Opening and 
Closing Argument, R. 30, lines 19-21; Jury Instruction No. 2, 
Court's Pleading File, R. 248). For example, in a letter from 
Nielsen's counsel to Metropolitan's counsel, dated February 27, 
1989, Nielsen's counsel indicated that he and Nielsen believed 
Nielsen's injuries to be worth at least $500,000, but stated that 
Nielsen was willing to settle his uninsured motorist claim for 
the amount of $250,000. They concluded the demand for $250,000 
by stating the following: "We sincerely hope that Metropolitan 
will deal in good faith and pay its limits without causing 
further delay, . . .. " (Barbara Maw Affidavit and attachments). 
Further, in the course of the trial at the time that the 
motions in limine were heard, it was made a matter of record that 
the policy limit for this particular case was $250,000. (See 
Motion in Limine During Trial Proceedings, R. 15: 9-13). 
Further, in a hearing that took place before the Honorable Judge 
Homer Wilkinson regarding objections to the entry of judgment on 
March 2, 1990, it was also made clear that all parties at the 
time of trial recognized that the maximum policy limit that 
applied in this case was $250,000. (Objection to Entry of 
Judgment, R. 3, lines 13-14, R. 6, lines 9-25, R. 7, lines 1-5, 
and R. 8, lines 7-15). 
Nielsen's reliance on the testimony cited on pages 17 and 18 
of his brief for the proposition that he intended to claim more 
than the $250,000 policy limit and that this was understood by 
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both parties at the time of the hearing and supported by this 
transcript is clearly misplaced. The transcript Nielsen refers 
to in his brief was taken as a result of Metropolitan's objection 
to the entry of judgment. Respondent's objection was that the 
understanding of all parties in the course of negotiations and 
through trial was that the applicable policy limit was $250,000. 
At no time did Metropolitan ever state otherwise at the hearing. 
To now imply that an issue as to the policy limits existed prior 
to the time of this hearing is plain wrong. In fact there was 
never any expectation on the part of Nielsen that the policy 
limit was other than $250,000. (Objection to Entry of Judgment, 
R. 3, lines 11-14, R. 6, lines 9-25, R. 7, lines 1-5 and R. 8, 
lines 7-15). 
Further, in his proposed jury instructions and special 
verdict form, dated February 10, 1990, Nielsen proposed the 
following: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
* * * 
Defendant Metropolitan Property and 
Liability Insurance Company issued a policy 
of insurance to plaintiff Richard Nielson, 
providing that if Richard Nielson is injured 
in an automobile accident caused by someone 
who does not have insurance, Metropolitan 
will pay up to its policy limits for the 
amount, if any, the uninsured driver is 
legally liable for Richard Nielson's 
damages. Therefore Metropolitan will be 
liable for the damages, if any, you award in 
favor of plaintiff Richard Nielson and 
against defendant O'Reilly up to the amount 
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of $250,000, its policy limit. (Court's 
Pleading File, R. 248) (emphasis added). 
And on page 3 of Nielsen's proposed special verdict form, Nielsen 
proposed that the following question be answered by the jury: 
7. What amount is owing to the plaintiff 
under the Metropolitan policy as a 
result of this accident? $ 
-,-----------,:--{This amount cannot exceed $250,000.) 
{Court's Pleading File, R. 266-267). 
Finally, it should be pointed out that, although counsel for 
both parties agreed on the record in the judge's chambers to 
allow the judge to determine the amount of liability Metropolitan 
would be responsible for on a judgment for Nielsen, the under-
standing clearly was that the only issue left for the court to 
determine was the amount, if any, to be deducted from the 
$250,000 limit based on payments made by Metropolitan to Nielsen 
prior to this action. It was never agreed, nor was it intended 
by either party that the judge would determine the applicable 
policy limits, since all indications were that such was clear to 
both parties prior to that time. 
Prior to the jury verdict, Nielsen never pled a right to 
anything more than the single limit of $250,000 for uninsured 
motorist coverage, and never claimed such a right during the 
trial of this action. Thus, having clearly been presented with 
the opportunity to claim such a right prior to or during the time 
this action was tried, Nielsen has waived any right he may have 
had to a claim against Metropolitan, and :is therefore precluded 
from doing so now. 
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As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Combe v. Warren's Family 
Drive Inns Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984): 
It is error to adjudicate issues not raised 
before or during trial and unsupported by 
the record. The trial court is not privi-
leged to determine matters outside the 
issues of the case, and if he does, his 
findings will have no force or effect. In 
law or in equity, a judgment must be respon-
sive to the issues framed by the pleadings, 
and the trial court has no authority to 
render a decision on issues not presented 
for determination. Any findings rendered 
outside the issues are a nullity. The court 
may not grant judgment for relief which is 
neither requested by the pleadings nor 
within the theory on which the case was 
tried, whether that theory was expressly 
stated or implied by the proof adduced. 
Parties may limit the scope of the liti-
gation if they choose, and if an issue is 
clearly withheld, the court cannot neverthe-
less adjudicate it and grant corresponding 
relief. Id. at 736 (citations omitted). 
Obviously, Nielsen himself did not expect more than the 
single $250, 000 limit to be available. He apparently knew, prior 
to the jury reaching its verdict, that to expect otherwise would 
be contrary to the clear and unambiguous terms of the policy. 
Nielsen's new expectations, based on the amount of the judgment 
obtained against the uninsured motorist, does not change what his 
real expectations were at the time he entered into the insurance 
contract with Metropolitan. Thus, the policy should be enforced 
as it was written, and, according to the plain meaning of its 
limitation provision. Nielsen should be allowed recovery under 
the single policy limit of $250,000 for injury to "one person." 
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III. 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST P''RSUANT TO §15-1-1 1 
U.C.A. !3 NOT APPROPRIATE IN PERSONAL INJURY 
ACTIONS. 
Nielsen is making a claim for prejudgment interest on the 
damages he was awarded by the jury. In attempts to circumvent 
the clear intent of Utah law with respect to this issue (prejudg-
ment interest), Nielsen claims this is a contract action and in 
support of that claim cites Beck v. Farmers, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1985). In essence, Nielsen is trying to make a contract action 
out of a case that is clearly a tort action. While it is true 
that an action by an insured against his carrier is an action 
based on contract, this is not such an action. No suit has been 
filed against Metropolitan with regard to coverage nor have any 
claims been made. Rather, Nielsen is attempting to claim what 
Utah law clearly does not allow, by couching this action as a 
contract action rather than recognizing that the claim he is 
making is for prejudgment interest on the damages he sustained in 
the underlying tort action (the automobile accident). Clearly, 
then §15-1-1(2} relied upon by Nielsen does not apply since this 
is a personal injury action with unliquidated damages not a 
contract action with liquidated damages. 
The real issue in this case is whether prejudgment interest 
is allowed in circumstances "where damages are incomplete or 
cannot be calculated with mathematical accuracy." In this regard 
Utah law is clear: 
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. . . where damages are incomplete or cannot 
be calculated with mathematical accuracy, 
such as in the case of personal injury, 
. . . , the amount of the damage must be 
ascertained and assessed by the trier of 
fact at the trial, and in such cases pre-
judgment interest is not allowed. Smith v. 
Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P. 2d 1222 (Utah 
App. 1990) and cases cited therein. 
The Smith court also noted that: 
[f]or damages to be calculable 
with mathematical certainty, they 
must be ascertained in accordance 
with fixed rules of evidence and 
known standards of value, 
Id. p. 1226. 
In the present case, Nielsen's damages were the result of 
personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident. The 
damages could not be calculated with mathematical accuracy, and 
in fact, one of the major purposes of the trial in this case was 
to allow the jury, as the trier of fact, to ascertain and assess 
not only the damages but liability as well. Therefore, according 
to Utah law, prejudgment interest is not allowed on such damages. 
In his brief Nielsen is attempting to draw a distinction 
between a contract and tort claim. In attempting to make that 
distinction, i.e., this is a contract claim, Nielsen argues that 
prejudgment interest is applicable. However, the claim here is 
for prejudgment interest on Nielsen's personal injury award. A 
claim Utah courts have made clear is not capable of mathematical 
certainty and hence prejudgment interest is not allowed. 
Nielsen argues that his claim for prejudgment interest is 
consistent with the Utah Supreme court's decision on that issue 
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in Jorgensen v. John Clay and Company, 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983). 
However, it should be pointed out that Jorgensen was a contract 
action between merchants, where the amount of damages was able to 
be calculated precisely to the penny prior to trial. In holding 
that, under those circumstances, prejudgment interest would be 
allowed, the Utah Supreme Court reasoned as follows: 
This is not an instance such as a case 
involving personal injury, false imprison-
ment, wrongful death, defamation, or the 
like . The damages were mathemat-
ically calculated. Id. at 233 (citations 
omitted) . 
The situation presented in Jorgensen is entirely different 
from the situation presented here. In the present case, 
Nielsen's damages are the result of a "personal injury," and 
those damages have to be established through testimony at trial 
and eventually became, at best, an estimate by the jury. 
Therefore, the Jorgensen opinion cited by Nielsen as being 
consistent with his claim for prejudgment interest in this case 
really does not support such a claim at all, but instead, only 
emphasizes the Utah Supreme Court's position that prejudgment 
interest is not allowed in a case such as the present one, where 
the damages cannot be calculated with "mathematical certainty" 
and are left for determination by the jury at trial. 
In further support of his argument that he is entitled to 
prejudgment interest, Nielsen cites various cases from other 
jurisdictions where an award of prejudgment interest was allowed 
based on the fact the insurer either knew or admitted that the 
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insured was entitled to damages which would exceed the uninsured 
motorist po 1 icy 1 imi ts. However, such presents a situation 
entirely different from that at issue in the present case. 
Although Nielsen implies that Metropolitan did not "sincerely" 
dispute the fact or amount of its liability under the insurance 
policy with Nielsen, such is to the contrary. In fact, 
Metropolitan disputed both the damages and its liability to 
Nielsen. Therefore, until the jury had determined those issues 
in this case, Nielsen's damages constituted the type of 
unliquidated personal injury damages which cannot be calculated 
with "mathematical certainty," and on which the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that prejudgment interest is not allowed. 
IV. 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON SPECIAL DAMAGES IS 
AN ITEM OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, AND THERE-
FORE SUBJECT TO THE $250,000 POLICY LIMIT. 
Nielsen cites Utah Code Ann. §78-27-44 for the proposition 
that he is entitled to prejudgment interest on the special 
damages awarded in this case. Metropolitan does not dispute that 
Nielsen's damages include prejudgment interest on Nielsen's 
special damages in this case. However, this does not somehow 
increase the policy limits applicable to uninsured motorist 
coverage under the Metropolitan policy issued to Nielsen. Under 
the provision of the Metropolitan policy dealing with uninsured 
motorist coverage, Metropolitan agreed to pay: 
[A]ll sums which the insured or his legal 
representative shall be legally entitled to 
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recover as damages because of bodily injury 
sustained by the insured, caused by accident 
and arising out of the ownership, mainten-
ance or use of an uninsured highway vehicle: 
As previously discussed, however, the insured is only entitled to 
recover such damages up to the applicable policy limit, which is 
$250,000 in this case. Prejudgment interest is simply a part of 
those damages on which recovery is limited under the policy. 
As stated in 15A Couch on Insurance 2d, §56:10 {1983): 
It must be recognized that the insurer is 
responsible for the payment of prejudgment 
interest as such interest is an i tern of 
damage covered by the policy, but the 
insurer is generally only obligated to pay 
all damages up to policy limits. 
The court in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Starke, 797 P.2d 14 {Colo. 
1990), a personal injury action, dealt with the issue of whether 
the insurer was obligated to pay prejudgment interest in excess 
of its policy limit. In finding that ·the insurer was not 
entitled to prejudgment interest in excess of its policy limits, 
this court held that: 
. . . prejudgment interest is an element of 
compensatory damages, thus limiting an 
insurer's liability for prejudgment interest 
to the policy's damages coverage. Id. 19 
and cases cited therein. 
In Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1979), after the 
parties to a medical malpractice suit reached a tentative 
settlement agreement, the parties requested a declaratory 
judgment with respect to the medical Inalpractice insurer's 
liability for prejudgment interest. The trial court determined 
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that, although the plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest 
on damages, the insurer was not obligated to pay such interest in 
excess of the applicable policy limits. Plaintiff then appealed. 
on appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the trial court's 
judgment, and held as follows: 
The issue, therefore, is whether prejudgment 
interest is an item of "damages" within the 
damage liability clause. We believe that 
our prior decisions establish, in accordance 
with the great weight of authority, that 
prejudgment interest is an item of compens-
atory damages. 
* * * 
Classification of prejudgment interest as an 
item of damages clarifies, in other 
respects, the obligations the insurer owes 
to the insured. While the insurer will not 
be liable for prejudgment interest in excess 
of the applicable damage limitation, the 
insurer will be liable for any prejudgment 
interest which, when added to damages 
rendered against the insured, does not 
exceed the limitation on liability. 591 at 
1286-1287. 
In Factory Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of America v. Cooper, 
262 A.2d 370 (R.I. 1970), which has been cited by other 
jurisdictions as the leading case on this issue, a declaratory 
judgment action was brought by an insurer under an automobile 
policy to determine the extent of its liability to pay 
prejudgment interest to the judgment creditors of its insured. 
the court in that case, without making any distinctions between 
interest on general damages or special damages, held that the 
insurer was not obligated to pay prejudgment interest in excess 
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of its applicable policy limits. After noting that an insurance 
contract, which contains terms that are clear and unambiguous, 
must be applied as written, and after noting that the judgment 
against the insured below had properly included prejudgment 
interest as part of the damage award, the court stated that: 
In our judgment, the policy language "all 
sums which the insured shall become legally 
obligated to pay as damages" and "damages 
which are payable under the terms of this 
policy" is unambiguous, and the clause 
"legally obligated to pay as damages" refers 
to the judgments entered by the clerk of the 
court under our practice and not to the 
amount of the verdicts. 
The obligation of the plaintiff [insurer] 
is, of course, different from that of the 
insureds. The latter remain liable for the 
total amount of the judgments, but the 
liability of the plaintiff insurance company 
is limited to the policy limit of $20,000, 
plus the supplementary payments which it is 
obligated to make under the "supplementary 
payments" provision in Part I of the policy. 
We hold that the plaintiff is not obligated 
to pay as "damages" interest in excess of 
its policy limit added to the verdicts under 
§9-21-10." 262 A.2d at 373. 
In Bossert v. Douglas, 557 P.2d 1164, (Okla. App. 1976), an 
insured, who had obtained a judgment against an employer and 
employee in an action brought to recover for injuries sustained 
by his son in an automobile collision, brought a garnishment 
action against the defendant's insurers. The insurers tendered 
their policy limits for satisfaction of the judgment, and the 
plaintiff executed a partial release of judgment. The trial 
court then entered judgment against the insurers for prejudgment 
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and post-judgment interest and court costs. The insurers 
appealed. After consolidation of the appeals, the Court of 
Appeals for Oklahoma held that, since both insurers had paid 
their policy limits towards satisfaction of the judgment, they 
were discharged from any liability as to prejudgment interest on 
the damages awarded to plaintiff in the underlying action. 557 
P.2d at 1168. 
Finally, as the previously cited cases have discussed, the 
obligation of an insurer is obviously different from that of an 
insured with respect ~o the payment of Nielsen's damages, 
including that portion of Nielsen 1 s damages referred to as 
prejudgment interest. While it is clear that ~ne "insured" or 
responsible par·ty (which is the uninsured motorist in this case) 
remains liable for the total amount of the judgment, which 
includes prejudgment interest, the liability of :...:~~ insurance 
company, is limited to the applicable policy limits under the 
terms of the insurance contract. Therefore, in the instant case, 
where it has been determined that Nielsen is entitled to the 
applicable $250,000 limit for uninsured motorist coverage under 
the Metropolitan policy, Metropolitan • s obligation under the 
terms of the insurance policy issued to Nielsen cannot exceed the 
applicable $250,000 limit, even if it were found that Nielsen is 
entitled to prejudgment interest as a part of his special damage 
award in this case. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the foregoing, Metropolitan requests the court rule 
as a general proposition and as a matter of law: (1) separate 
policy limits do not stack; ( 2) Nielsen is entitled to the 
$250,000 "per person" limit and not the $500,000 limit for "each 
accident"; {3) personal injury actions pursuant to §15-1-1, 
U. C. A. , are unliquidated damages and hence not subject to 
prejudgment interest; and (4) prejudgment interest on special 
damages cannot exceed Metropolitan's $250,000 policy limit. 
Further, Nielsen failed to raise the above four issues in 
the underlying action. It follows then that Nielsen has waived 
his right to raise those issues and estopped from doing so now. 
In sum, this court should rule that Nielsen's recovery 
against Metropolitan is limited to $250,000, its policy limits 
for injury to "one person". 
Dated this c/~-1 day of /f£4d 
STRONG & HANNI 
1 1991. 
By--=.....o~~~:;.:;_'M'----~,/_-1 ~.,.---J __ _ 
Glenn c. Hanni 
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Barbara L. Maw 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Respondent Metropolitan 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that ~ true and correct copies of the 
foregoing was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, this r:::?-tC 
day of ~j , 1991, to the following: 
101032bc 
L. Rich Humpherys 
Karra J. Porter 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Glenn c. Hanni 
Barbara L. Maw 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Metropolitan Property & Liability 
Insurance Company 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. NIELSEN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellant ) 
) Case No. 900489 
vs. ) 
) Priority No. 16 
MARK O'REILLY, LINDA R. FRENCH ) 
and METROPOLITAN PROPERTY & ) 
LIABILITY INSURANCE CO., ) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA L. MAW 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
BARBARA L. MAW, being first duly sworn on her oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys representing Metropolitan 
Insurance Company in the suit brought by Richard Nielsen. Richard 
Nielsen is represented by Richard Humpherys. 
2. On several occasions in the course of preparing this 
matter for trial and the actual trial of this matter, it has always 
101062bc 
been the understanding of all parties to this action that 
Metropolitan's policy limit was $250,000. (See Objection to Entry 
of Judgment, R. 3, lines 11-14; R. 5, lines 7-17 and R. 6, lines 9-
15; Motion in Limine, R. 11, lines 5-10, R. 15, lines 9-13; 
Plaintiff's Counsel's Opening and Closing Argument, R. 30, lines 
19-21; Jury Instruction No. 2, Court's Pleading File, R. 248.) 
3. At no time in the course of discovery and preparing this 
case for trial and trying this matter did any party to this action 
ever state or indicate that the policy limits were other than 
$250,000. 
4. The letters attached to this affidavit and incorporated 
herein by reference are letters received by affiant showing an 
understanding by all parties that the applicable policy limit was 
$250,000. (See attached letters marked Exhibits A through I.) 
Barbara L. Maw 
Subscribed and sworn to before me i:his .....:?~': day of 
_......a~;oue""'-"'-"'=-· __ , 19 91. 
My Commission Expires: 
101062bc 2 
Tab A 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CHRISTENSEN, .JENSEN & POWELL 
RAY R.CHRISTENSEN 
.JAY E . .JENSEN 
ELWOOD P. POWELL 
RICHARD L. EVANS • .JR. 
ROGER P CHRISTENSEN 
DALE .J. LAM BERT 
L. RICH HUMPHERYS 
TODD S. WINEGAR 
DENTON M. HATCH 
WILLIAM .J. HANSEN 
M. DOUGLAS BAYLY 
PHILLIP S. FERGUSON 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS 
.JAN P. MALMBERG 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
GAINER M. WALDBILLIG 
LEE C. HENNING 
WESLEY M. LANG 
RICHARD VAN'T ROOD 
Barbara Maw 
Strong & Hanni 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
510 CLARK LEAMING BUILDING 
175 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
February 27, 1989 
6th Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Nielsen v. O'Reilly 
Dear Barbara: 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN 
(1886-1979) 
OF COUNSEL 
CRAIG V. WENTZ 
TELEPHONE 3SS-3431 
AREA CODE 801 
We have prepared answers to your discoveries, a copy of 
which I enclose. We are in the process of having the original 
answers signed by my clients and I will forward them to you as 
soon as they are signed and alert you to any changes that may be 
made, if there be any. Pursuant to the request of Paul Schlegel 
(claims representative for Metropolitan) I am forwarding to him a 
copy of this letter and plaintiff's discovery responses. 
We are now in a position to negotiate settlement of 
this case andjor proceed to trial. The enclosed Answer to 
Interrogatories outline in detail the damages and injuries 
sustained by Mr. Nielsen. In summary, Mr. Nielsen is claiming 
special damages as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3 • 
4. 
5. 
Medical expenses 
Mileage expenses (driving for 
medical treatment) at 
$.25 per mile. 
Lost earnings 
Reasonable value of loss 
of household services 
Interest at 8% pursuant to 
§ 78-27-44 Utah Code 
Annotated 
TOTAL 
$11,410.45 '/-'' .·-!'·-~ 
$3,000.00 (approx.) ; 
$27,000.00 .'v /.f-.'A'>:'n/~f!' 
$2,850.00 
$20,182:76 
$64,443.21 
' . 
I ( / t" !,} ;:'{,· •.. / 
In addition to the above past losses, plaintiff is 
claiming future losses of 
Future Medical expenses: 
HRISTENSEN, .JENSEN & POWELL 
Barbara Maw 
February 27, 1989 
Page 2 
1. 
2 0 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
psychiatric consultations, 
psychostimulant medication 
and cognitive rehabilitation 
(per Dr. Nielsen's report) 
possible back surgery 
periodic physical therapy 
for life (life expectancy 
of 26 years) 
periodic doctor visits for 
medication, etc. twice a 
year for life 
periodic dental repair 
of crowns and chips 
future lost earnings 
(see Interrogatory 12) 
GRAND TOTAL 
$17,000.00 
$4,500.00 
$4,000.00 
$2,600.00 
$3,000.00 
$453,500.00 
~:484' 600. 00 
~>549' 043.21 
Concerning general damages, two separate and 
independent doctors have given Mr. Nielsen the same disability 
rating of 15% partial permanent for his back. This is a serious 
disability to a man whose career, work, and recreation have 
revolved around physical activity. Now, instead of enjoying 
physical labor and activity, it is extremely painful, and he is 
unable to perform much of this labor and activity. 
Concerning liability, as you are aware, the driver was 
quite drunk with a .15% blood alcohol content. I enclosed a copy 
of the lab report. I also understand that: he plead guilty to 
drunk driving. The evidence is also clear that the plaintiff had 
the right of way and the defendant driver had a red light at the 
time he broad sided plaintiff. Besides the investigating 
officer, we have eye witnesses that will confirm these facts and 
to my knowledge, there are no witnesses to the contrary. Given 
the above circumstances, particularly the drunk driving, a jury 
will be quite prone to award substantial damages and give the 
benefit of the doubt to Mr. Nielsen. Given the serious nature of 
Mr. Nielsen's injuries we believe that a jury would likely award 
an amount far in excess of $250,000.00. I have discussed this 
case at length with my client and he believes that his case is 
worth at least $500,000. Mr. Nielsen desires to avoid further 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & PowELL 
Barbara Maw 
February 27, 1989 
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delay and cost associated with trial. He is therefore willing to 
settle his uninsured motorist claim for the amount of $250,000 
and makes demand therefore. This offer shall remain open for 60 
days after which time it will terminate and we will proceed to 
trial. 
We sincerely hope that Metropolitan will deal in good 
faith and pay its limits without causing further delay, 
additional costs and emotional stress to the Nielsen by forcing 
the matter to trial. It has taken a long time for Mr. Nielsen to 
verify his true injuries and damages. Metropolitan should now 
appropriately respond. 
LRH:pkc 
Enclosure 
cc: Richard H. Nielsen 
Paul Schlegel 
Ron Schiess 
Bob cummings 
Very truly yours, 
:;J2 J~/Y &-p.._,_.......-/'.. ~-)·~ch Hump~ 
Tab B 
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
JAY E. JENSEN 
ELWOOD P. POWELL • 
RICHARD L. EVANS. JR." 
ROGER P CHRISTENSEN 
DALE J. LAMBERT 
L. RICH HUMPHERYS 
TODD S. WINEGAR t 
DENTON M. HATCH 
WILLIAM J. HANSEN 
M. DOUGLAS BAYLY 
PHILLIPS. FERGUSON 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS 
JAN P. MALMBERG 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
GAINER M. WALDBILLIG 
LEE C. HENNING 
WESLEY M. LANG 
RICHARD VAN'T ROOD 
KELLY H. MACFARLANE 
KARRA J. PORTER 
MARK L. ANDERSON 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CHRISTENSEN, .JENSEN & POWELL 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
SIO CLARK LEAMING BUILDING 
175 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE (801) 355-3431 
FAX (801) 355-3472 
April 20, 1989 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN 
(1B86- 1979) 
OF COUNSEL 
CRAIG V. WENTztt 
ABA NET 10: ABA 17916 
.. ALSO LICENSED lN W.t.SH.,O.C. _.NO COlOR"OO 
,.'~'AlSO LICENSED IN CAlifORNIA 
tA.LSO liCENSED IN A.RIZONA 
't't'ALSO LICENSED IN WASHINGTON STATE 
Barbara Maw 
Strong & Hanni 
6th Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake city, UT 84111 
Re: Nielsen v. O'Reilly 
Dear Barbara: 
I enclose a copy of a report from Dr. Glenn T. Goodwin 
concerning the plaintiff's current progress relating to the brain 
damage. 
I also acknowledge receipt of your responses to Request 
for Admissions. In reviewing them, it appears that Metropolitan 
has denied almost all of the Requests on the basis of "no 
information or belief." Under Rule 36(a), it states: 
"An answering party may not give lack of 
information or knowledge as a reason for 
failure to admit or deny unless he states 
that he has made reasonable inquiry and that 
the information known or readily obtainable 
by him is insufficient to enable him to admit 
or deny . n 
It is difficult to understand why Metropolitan claims 
it has no information when you have obtained a copy of the police 
report, taken the deposition of the plaintiff, have a copy of the 
blood alcohol test results, have been aware of the default of 
both Ms. French and Mr. O'Reilly, are aware of the criminal 
action against Mr. 0 'Reilly for DUI and have performed other 
discovery and investigation. I also understand that you andjor 
your carrier have made inquiry to determine whether there was any 
insurance on behalf of these two defendants. In light of all of 
this information, there appears to be no basis for Metropolitan's 
response of "no information or belief." 
The purpose of these requests for admissions was to 
avoid further complication of the trial by having numerous 
witnesses come into trial to lay the foundation for all of this 
CHRISTENSEN, .JENSEN & PowELL 
Barbara Maw 
April 20, 1989 
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information. This causes further delays and expense to the 
plaintiff because of Metropolitan's refusal to admit obvious 
facts. It is clear evidence of bad faith when a carrier forces 
its insured to jump through needless hoops and incur needless 
expenses and delays to meet the technical evidentiary 
requirements when such facts are obviously true and 
ascertainable. 
I request that you reconsider your responses to these 
requests for admissions. The information requested for admission 
is readily available to you by reasonable inquiry. If 
Metropolitan chooses to stand by its present responses, please be 
advised that I will seek to have your answers stricken pursuant 
to Rule 36(a) and I will seek attorney's fees. Further, my 
client is presently considering a bad faith claim against 
Metropolitan. If defendant Metropolitan requires plaintiff to 
prove each of these obvious facts, it will have an obvious 
bearing on the decision of whether to proceed with a bad faith 
action. 
Concerning settlement, I acknowledge receipt of a 
letter from Metropolitan wherein an offer of $60,000 was made. I 
had the occasion to discuss this offer with Paul Schlegel and we 
discussed the facts of the case for almost a half hour. I 
advised him that the offer of $60, 000 is n~j ected and because the 
offer is unreasonably low, my client does not wish to 
counteroffer. I advised him that if we can save additional costs 
and delays, my client might be interestE~d in compromising his 
claim a little; however, his offer was almost an insult. I 
advised Mr. Schlegel that I understand Glenn Hanni testified not 
too long ago about the approximate value of low back injuries in 
a legal malpractice case. I understand that with a low back 
injury somewhat similar to the plaintiff's injury, Ivir. Hanni 
testified that the likely verdict range is around $100,000 or 
even more. 
The plaintiff has many other serious injuries in 
addition to his low back injury, including a more significant 
injury--brain damage. For some reason, Metropolitan seems to 
ignore this damage. This is not a whiplash case where someone is 
claiming closed head injury. This is a significant head injury 
which resulted in unconsciousness for almost an hour. Any doctor 
will recognize that a concussion of this magnitude will likely 
result in brain damage. Therefore, the fact that doctor Nilsson 
has verified the brain damage is quite consistent with the head 
injury. 
Perhaps Metropolitan does not feel that this type of 
brain damage is worth very much. For your reference, I enclose a 
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copy of the judgment and jury verdict in the case of Benedict v 
Vallace where the jury awarded $375,000 primarily for similar 
brain damage. However, Benedict did not have a severe head 
injury and unconsciousness as Mr. Nielsen has had. The only 
physical injury Benedict sustained was a severe sprain to her 
foot, contusions to her kidneys and numerous bruises and cuts. 
The jury awarded $375,000 almost totally because of the brain 
damage. In that case, the defendant was a retired gentleman 
approximately 75 years old and there were no aggravating 
circumstances. In the present case we have an insurance company 
who has received a premium for $250,000 worth of coverage; we 
have an accident caused by a drunk who was uninsured and ran a 
red light; there is no issue concerning liability; and Mr. 
Nielsen is a very sympathetic plaintiff with severe injuries. 
Under these circumstances there is no question in my mind that 
the damages would exceed $250,000 if we are forced to try the 
case. Metropolitan's failure to negotiate in good faith and deal 
fairly with its insured is clearly evident by its present 
attitude toward settlement. 
We sincerely hope that Metropolitan will re-evaluate 
its position and negotiate in good faith without forcing its 
insured to go through the emotional trauma and expense associated 
with trial. 
I would appreciate a prompt reply to my request 
concerning Metropolitan's response to the Request for Admissions. 
We also need to have a prompt response to the pending 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents. We wish 
to certify this case for trial as soon as possible. The answers 
to these discoveries are long overdue. If there is some reason 
why you cannot respond within ten (10) days, please let me know. 
LRH:pkc 
Enclosure 
cc: Richard H. Nielsen 
Ron Schiess 
Bob Cummings 
Very truly yours, 
CHRISTENSEN, JENS & PO~ELL, 
~ ' // 
-----;:"" /~ /.// // 
v, ~r~~":.,mp~tf~?f 
P.C. 
NEUROLOGY, LEARNING AND BEHAVIlJR CENTER 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL CONSULTATION SERVICES 
6 70 Ea51 3900 Soul h. Suuc ll\0 I Sah Lake Ci.,·. U<ah 84107-1973 I T elcphone (80 l) 266-8895 
Sam Golds1cin, Ph.D. 
Da-id E. Nilsson. Ph.D. 
Sally l. Ingalls, Ph.D. 
Glenn T. Goodwin. Ph.D. 
Psy"·holt'lg}' • Ncuropsy~hnlt\~)" 
Michael Gold51<in. M.D. 
Nl·uroJogy - Ch1ld NcuroltlJ.:)' 
Mr. L. Rich Humpherys 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
RE: RICHARD H. NIELSEN 
Dear Mr. Humpherys: 
March 14, 1989 
P;~.igc S. Hinerman. Ph.D. CCC 
Laurie D. Fue. M.S .. CCC 
janet Goldsoein. M.S .. CCC 
Mark L fox. M.S .. CFY 
c,,gnn1vc Rt."h~•t>~lit:ultm/Spc.·c.·c.:h PJihtllnro· 
Elaine Pollock. B.A. 
Nancy S. Thorup, B.S. 
Edul'OJticm/Cngnui\-c Rch.1hil1t:nu'n 
As you are aware 1 Richard Nielsen is currently receiving 
psychotherapy and cognitive rehabilitation at our facility, The 
Neurology 1 Learning and Behavior Center. 
Cognitive rehabilitation is focusing on improvement of higher 
executive functioning including organizational skills. Treatment 
will also be addressing improvement of memory 1 and the 
development of compensatory strategies. The aim of Mr. Nielsen's 
cognitive rehabilitation program is to educate Mr. Nielsen as 
well as to provide him with the skills necessary to improve the 
symptoms that he is displaying as a result of a car accident in 
April 1983. Mr. Nielsen is also being seen in psychotherapy. 
The ~ai~ focus will be the further facilitation of his adaptive 
functioning. 
Mr. Nielsen reports continued fatigued, irritability and low 
tolerance levels. Mr. Nielsen is concerned that if these 
symptoms persist they may necessitate quitting his part-time job. 
If Mr. Nielsen decides to quit his part-time job, he is concerned 
over the financial ramifications this loss of income might 
generate. Mr. Nielsen is aware of the added stress that the 
part-time job contributes to his overall performance. 
Mr. Nielsen had asked that we share this .i;:tformation with you. 
Mr. L. Rich Humpherys 
March 14, 1989 
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RE: RICHARD NIELSEN 
If we can provide you with any more information, please do not 
hesitate to contact us. 
Sincerely, 
'-
I /' fJ {{__ (.... (.__ VG<_ "-."1--,---: c..-'-''--
Laurie D. Fue, M.S., CCC/SLP 
Speech/Language Pathology 
Cognitive Rehabilitation 
LDFjcs 
L2 
Glenn T. Goodwin, Ph.D. 
Neuropsychology 
ROBERT B. SYKES (Bar No. 3180) 
M. GALE LEMMON (Bar No. 4363) 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
311 South State Street, Suite 
SAlt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
I' 
. I . 
~ 3.1 ~ / I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I I -----------------------------------------------------------1 
II TERESA BENEDICT and HEIDI ) BENEDICT, a minor, through her ) 
j Guardian ad Li tem_cElayne ) I Woodard, ~ 
• Plaintiffs, ) i I i > 
i v. ) 
I JOHN VALLACE, ~ 
l i Defendant. ~ 
ij ,, 
l1 i! 
AMENDED 
JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT 
lf£,~0 
J/~);z-
lv'{J • ;S.:; .)---
2 ~ I J /'._ 7J-J 
Civil No. C-83-8207 
(Judge Conder) 
!I 
'I li 
On Monday, March 17, 1986, this case came before the 
court for jury trial, with the Honorable Dean Conder, District 
I 
i • 
I 
I 
Judge, presiding. ~he case was tried during the week of March 17 I 
through 21, 1986, and continued on from March 24 through 27, 19864 
I On March 27, 1986, the jury returned with a verdict, a certified I 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and included 
herein by reference. The sum of $4,136.81 in no-fault benefits 
was paid by Farmers Insurance Company on behalf of plaintiff 
Teresa Benedict. The sum of $4,136.81 should be deducted from 
the judgment. On Thursday, April 17, 1986, the parties again 
appeared before the court on defendant's motion to retax costs, 
~--W.E.B. 
3T.".TF r:;~=: UT.\H } 81& --~ . 
c-·<Ji\Tf Of SALT LAKE ) 
L T~c:C ~:·D~Fni2NI!!J, C-LERK Of' T.~ C~ 
,.-., ;~-: C-: '3/:..LT L~KE COI_i,".ITY. UT.~-~. ~0 t:O:f. -::::Y 
,,·:.;:y -,-~f·T THE i\N:;EXEiJ P.J~!J FC::i':.(:C:> -, :~ 
-.,;:. :~·!J rULL GC:OV Cf= /-.N C~~G;·'.'I. 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
which motion was granted in part. Based upon the foregoing, and 
good cause otherwise appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
Judgment is awarded against the defendant in the amount 
of $370,863.19, together with court costs in the amount of 
$526.74. 
DATED this 1-1- day of April, 1986. 
,.~.,..--~T 
•\ t ' c;:;. 
~ '~i '.;)N ~HNDLEY 
Cit tic 
~- :r-, ~ c..-.__<- ~ /"!- C, (_ l <-
BY THE COURT: 
HON. ~N CONDER 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing 
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT upon the attorney listed below 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Mr. Wendell E. Bennett 
Attorney for Defendant 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and by hand-delivering the same this lj~day of April, 1986. 
574J 
Approved as to form: 
~~-L-dt ~ENDELL E. BENNETT 
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RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
.JAY E . .JENSEN 
ELWOOD P. POWELL* 
RICHARD L. EVANS, JR.*"' 
ROGER P. CHRISTENSEN 
DALE .J. LAMBERT 
L. RICH HUMPHERYS 
TODD S. WINEGAR t 
DENTON M. HATCH 
WILLIAM .J. HANSEN 
M. DOUGLAS BAYLY 
PHILLIPS. FERGUSON 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS 
.JAN P. MALMBERG 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
GAINER M. WALDBILLIG 
LEE C. HENNING 
WESLEY M. LANG 
RICHARD VAN'T ROOD 
KELLY H. MACFARLANE 
KARRA .J. PORTER 
MARK L. ANDERSON 
Barbara Maw 
Strong & Hanni 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CHRISTENSEN, .JENSEN & POWELL 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
510 CLARK LEAMING BUILDING 
17S SOUTH WEST TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
(801) 3S5-3431 
June 13, 1989 
6th Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Nielsen v. O'Reilly 
Dear Barbara: 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN 
(1886- 1979) 
OF COUNSEL 
CRAIG V. WENTztt 
ABA NET 10: ABA 17916 
«ALSO liCENSED IN WASH .. D.C. AND COLORADO 
••ALSO LICENSED IN CALifORNIA 
tALSO LICENSED IN ARIZONA 
t1'AL50 LICENSED IN WASHINGTON STATE 
I received a letter from Thomas Beekman, dated June 6, 
1989, which rejected our settlement offer and further indicated 
that he was not offering $125,000 but only indicating that he 
would recommend such a settlement to the company. Therefore, it 
appears that the only offer that Metropolitan is extending to the 
plaintiff is $60,000. I am not sending a copy of that letter to 
you since the letter indicated a copy was sent to you. 
It is unfortunate that Metropolitan does not wish to 
negotiate in good faith with its insured and to extend a 
reasonable offer to settle this case. With a firm offer of only 
$60,000 on the table, it does not appear that negotiations with 
Metropolitan will prove fruitful. In light of Mr. Beekman's 
letter, plaintiff hereby withdraws its offer to settle in the 
a1no1..mt of $225,000. At the conclusion of the above case, my 
client will vigorously pursue a bad faith action against 
Metropolitan for its refusal to deal with its insured in good 
faith. 
I enclose an unsigned copy of our Answers to your last 
set of discoveries and a Certification for Readiness. As I have 
indicated, if you wish to pursue any additional discovery, I am 
happy to cooperate with you, however, I wish to have this matter 
tried as soon as possible. I am in the process -of obtaining 
plaintiff's signature and will send you the original when signed. 
In your letter of May 3, 1989, you requested the 
address and telephone numbers of Mr. Nielsen's golfing partners 
and of his brother-in-law. By looking in the phone book, I found 
all of their addresses and telephone numbers as follows: 
CHRISTENSEN, -JENSEN & PowELL 
Barbara Maw 
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Enclosure 
Keith Lord 
Jeff Tye 
Owan Denison 
Jerry Milne 
cc: Richard H. Nielsen 
Ron Schiess 
Bob Cummings 
4804 South RivermE=adow Way 
Murray, UT 
1006 West 4800 So. 
Murray, UT 
4910 Avant Circle 
West Valley, UT 
690 West 4800 So. 
Murray, UT 
Very truly yours, 
262-8431 
268-1650 
967-3297 
268-4163 
CHRIST~NSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
//-~ 0 ~~/(_ 
L. Rich Humpherys 
Tab D 
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
.JAY E . .JENSEN 
ELWOOD P. POWELL• 
RICHARD L. EVANS, .JR.•• 
ROGER P. CHRISTENSEN 
DALE .J. LAMBERT 
L. RICH HUMPHERYS 
TODD S. WINEGARt 
DENTON M. HATCH 
WILLIAM .J. HANSEN 
M. DOUGLAS BAYLY 
PHILLIP S. FERGUSON 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
GAINER M. WALDBILLl'G 
LEE C. HENNING 
WESLEY M. LANG 
KELLY H. MACFARLANE 
KARRA .J. PORTER1-+-t 
MARK L- ANDERSON 
Jim Ganci 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
510 CLARK LEAMING BUILDING 
175 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE (SOl) 355 ·3431 
FAX (801) 35S·3472 
December 15, 1989 
Metropolitan Property and 
Liability Insurance Company 
P.O. Box 675 
Warwick, RI 02887 
Re: Your Claim Number: DK300468RA 
Your Insured: Richard Nielsen 
Date of Loss: 04/23/83 
Dear Mr. Ganci: 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN 
(I 886- 1979) 
OF" COUNSEL. 
CRAIG V. WENTztt 
ABA NET 10: ABA 17916 
t~ALSO LICENSED IN WASH., D.C. AND COLORADO 
•~ALSO LICENSED IN CALIFORNIA 
tALSO LICENSED IN ARIZONA 
'H'ALSO LICENSED IM WASHINGTON STATE 
tt1'ALSO ltCENS£0 IN TEXAS 
Pursuant to our last telephone conversation of December 
14, I enclose a copy of the applicable Utah Unfair Claims 
Settlement Practice Act and prior regulations modeled after the 
uniform act, with the applicable subsections highlighted for your 
reference. The statute was not enacted until 1987 and as you will 
note in subsection (5), the act itself does not create a private 
cause of action. These elements, however, are taken from the 
uniform unfair claims practice act, which represent the standards 
in the industry. In addition, all of the companies that I have 
dealt with have all made the provisions contained in the uniform 
unfair claims practice act a part of their claims procedure 
manuals. Regardless of whether there is a private cause of action 
under the Utah statute, there certainly is a bad faith action based 
upon a breach of the standards in the industry and your own claims 
procedures (assuming you have adopted said principles, if not, 
Metropolitan would clearly be out of step with industry practice) . 
As I explained, in first party coverage, a company has 
the good faith duty to promptly, fairly and equitably make an offer 
on every claim where liability is reasonably clear. In this case, 
there is no question of coverage for and injury to Mr. Nielsen. 
Therefore, Metropolitan has a good faith duty to promptly, fairly 
and equitably offer an amount in settlement of this coverage. I 
am not suggesting that a company cannot try to negotiate the 
settlement of all claims, including bad faith claims, however, if 
the company refuses to also negotiate separately the settlement of 
a first party claim which is "reasonably clear", then the company 
is further engaging in bad faith practices. 
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~he above principle does not apply· to third party 
claimants where the claimant "is not in privity of contract with 
the insurer", or in other words, where the claimant is not an 
insured. In third party situations, there is nothing improper in 
requiring a settlement of all claims or in refusing to settle part 
of the outstanding claims. However, such is not the case in a 
first party setting. 
I do not believe there is anything improper with 
Metropolitan making an offer to settle all claims. However, I 
believe it is quite improper and in bad faith for Metropolitan to 
refuse "to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable settlement of" 
the UM claims of Mr. Nielsen where "liability is reasonably clear." 
Based on our discussion, I understand Metropolitan is unwilling to 
negotiate or make an offer to settle only the U:r-1: claim. 
You indicated that you would be getting back with me 
sometime during the week of the 18th. I look f'orward to hearing 
from you. 
Very truly, 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By: 
L. Rich Humpherys 
LRHjjc 
cc: Barbara Maw (wjencl.) ~ 
Ronald G. Schiess (wjencl.) 
Robert C. Cummins (wjencl.) 
Richard Nielsen 
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Authon ty 
Section 31-2-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, provides that the Comnissioner of 
Insurance shall have the powers and authority expressly conferred by or 
reasonably implied from the proVISlons of the code; Sect1on 31-2-3.5(1), Utah 
Code Annotated, empowers the CommiSSioner to make reasonable rules and 
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(i) "Third party claimant" means any individual, corporation, association, 
partnership or other legal entity asserting a claim against any individual, 
corporation, association, partnership or other legal entity insured under 
an insurance policy or insurance contract of an insurer; 
(j) "\'lorker'~ Compensation" includes, but is not limited to, Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Worker's Compensation; and 
(k) "General business practice" means a pattern of conduct found by the 
Commissioner by hearing or other legal process, on the basis of evidence 
from Court, Department, or licensee records, witness testimony, or other 
credible evidence, of policy, procedure, or practice. 
Section 5. Unfair tv1ethods of Comoetition and Unfair or Deceotive Acts 
ana Practices Der1nea 
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of compet1t1on and unfair or 
deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance: 
(a) misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to 
coverages at issue; 
(b) failing to ackno-....:ledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with 
respect to claims arising under insurance policies; 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt 
investigation of claims. arising under insurance policies; 
refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation; 
- . 
failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time 
proof of loss statements have been completed and co~rrunicated to the 
company or its representative; 
(f) not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable 
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear; 
(g) compelling insureds to i~stitute litigation to recover amounts due under an 
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately 
recovered in actions brought by such insureds when claims or demands have 
been made for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately 
recovered; 
(h) attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable 
person hould ha\·e believed he or she 1-.:as entitled by reference to written 
or printed ad\·e~tising material reasonably related to the insurance 
co;,t:-act; 
(i) attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was 
altered without not1ce to, or knowledge or consent of the insured; 
-~-
(j) making claims payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompanied by a 
statement or explanation of benefits setting forth the coverage under which 
the payments are being made; 
(k) making known to insureds or claimants a policy of appealing from arbitra-
tion awarcis in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling 
them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount a1~arded in 
arbitration; 
(1) delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requ1r1ng an insured, 
claimant, or the physician of either to submit a preliminary claim report 
and then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, 
both of 1~hich submissions contain substantially the same information; 
(m) failing to promptly settle claims, where liability has become reasonably 
clear, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to in-
fluence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage 
or under other policies of insurance; 
(n) failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis, in the 
insurance policy, the facts or the applicable law, for denial of a claim or 
for the offer of a compromise settlement; 
(o) refusing payment of a claiin solely on the basis of an insured's request to 
do so unless: 
(1) the insured claims sovereign, eleemosynary, diplomatic, military 
service, or other immunity from suit or liability with respect to such 
claim; or 
(2) the insured is granted th'e right under the policy of insurance to 
consent to settlement of· claims; 
(p) directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney; and 
(q) misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations. 
Section 6. File and Record Documentation 
The insurer's claim files shall be subject to examination by the Com~issioner or 
by his duly appointed designees. Such files shall contain all notes and work 
papers perta1n1ng to the claim in such detail that pertinent events and the 
dates of such events can be reconstructed. 
Section 1. ~lisreDres~~:atlon of ?olicy Provisions 
(a) No insurer shall fail to fully d1sclose to first party claimants all perti-
nent benefits, coverages or other provisions of an insurance policy or 
insurance contract unJer hn1ch a claim is presented. 
1 INSURAN1 CODE 31A-26-304 
!Icen~e If no time ts spec1hed the former licensee 
m:n not <pply for a new ltcense tor ll\e years wtthout 
the e-..pre<>s approval of the commiSsiOner 
(6\ -\nv person whose hcense 1~ ~uspended or re-
voked under SubsectiOn (2) shall, \\hen the suspen-
~wn ends or a new hcense 1s Issued pay all fees that 
would have been payable If the ltcense had not been 
suspended or revoked unless the commissiOner by 
order wmves the payment of the mtenm fees If a new 
license ts Issued more than three years after the revo 
catwn of a stmtlar ltcense, thts subsectiOn apphes 
onlv to the fees that would have accrued dunne; the 
three years Immedtately followmg the revocatiOn 
1985 
31A-26-214. Probation. 
( 1 l In any Circumstances that would JUSttfv a sus-
pensiOn under Sectwn 31A-26-213, the commiSSioner 
may mstead, after a formal adJUdicatiVe proceedmg, 
put the licensee on probation for a specified penod no 
longer than 12 months 
(2) Tne probation order shall state the comiitwns 
for retentiOn of the license, wh1ch shall be reasonable 
(3) Vwlatwn of the probatiOn IS grounds for Imme-
diate revocatiOn w1thout a formal adJudicative pro-
ceedme;, unless one 1s requested 1987 
PART III 
CLAIM PRACTICES 
31A-26-301. Timely payment of clauns. 
(1) Unless otherw1se provided by law, an msurer 
shall timely pay every valid msurance cla1m made by 
an msured By rule the comm1sswner may prescnbe 
the kmds of notice and proof of loss that wtll establish 
vahdtty, the manner m wh1ch an msurer may make a 
bona fide demal of a cla1m, the penods of time w1thm 
wh1ch payment IS requ1red to be made to be timely, 
and the reasonable mterest rates to be charged upon 
late cla1m payments 
(2) Notw1thstandmg Subsectwn (1), the payment of 
a clatm IS not overdue dunng any penod m wh1ch the 
msurer IS unable to pay the cla1m because there IS no 
rec1p1ent legally able to giVe a vahd release for the 
payment, or m wh1ch the msurer IS unable to deter-
mme who IS entitled to rece1ve the payment, prov1ded 
that the msurer has promptly not1fied the clatmant of 
the mabthty and has offered m good faith to p..1v the 
claim oromptly when the mab1ltty IS removed 
(3) Thts sectwn apphes only to cla1ms made by 
claimants m direct pnv1ty of contract wtth the m-
surer 1985 
31A-26-302. Settlement of clauns m credtt hfe 
and disab1hty msurance. 
(1) The credttor shall promptly report all cla1ms to 
the msurer or 1ts des1gnated cla1m representative 
The msurer shall mamtam adequate cla1ms files All 
cla1ms shall be settled as soon as possible m accor-
dance with the terms of the msurance contract 
(2) The msurer shall pay all cla1ms etther bv draft 
drawn upon the msurer or by check of the msurer to 
the order of the clatmant to whom pavment of the 
clmm ts due pursuant to the poltcv provtswns, or 
upon dtrectwn of that clmmant to another 
(3) No person other than the msurer or 1ts desig-
nated claim representative mav settle or adJust 
clatms The credttor mav not be de,te;nated as a 
clatms representative 1985 
3IA-26-303. Unfatr clatm settlement pracuces. 
( 1 No m'urer or person reoresentmg an msurer 
mav engage m any unfatr clatm settlement practtce 
under Sub~ectwns (2l. (3\ and (4) 
<2) Each of the followmg acts IS an unfair cla1m 
,ett!Pment practice 
(a) knowme;ly mtsrepresentmg matenal facts 
or the contents of msurance policy provisions at 
Issue m connectiOn with a clmm under an msur-
ance contract however, thts provision does not 
1r ' the failure to disclose mformatwn. 
, "ttemptmg to use a policy applicatiOn 
whtcn was altered bv the msurer without notice 
to, or knowledge, or consent of, the msured as the 
basts for settling or refusmg to settle a cla1m or 
(c) failmg to settle a claim promotly under one 
portwn of the msurance pohcy coverae;e, where 
habihty and the amount of loss are reasonably 
clear, m order to mfluence settlements under 
other portiOns of the msurance pohcv coverage, 
but thts SubsectiOn (2J(c) applies only to claims 
made by persons m direct pnvrty of contract wrth 
the msurer 
- (3) Each of the followmg ts an unfair claim settle-
ment practice tf commrtted or performed wrth such 
frequency as to md1cate a general busmess practice 
by an msurer or persons representmg an msurer 
r a) fatiing to ackno-...ledge and act promptly 
upon commumcauons about claims under msur-
ance policies 
(b) failmg to adopt and tmplement reasonable 
standards for the prompt mvesttgatiOn and pro-
cE•ssmg of cla1ms under msurance pohc1es, 
,.- (c) compelling msureds to mst1tute litigatiOn 
to recover amounts due under an msurance pol-
ICY by olfermg substantially less than the 
amounts ultimately recovered m actiOns brought 
bv those msureds when the amounts clat.med 
~ere reasonably near to the amounts recovered; 
(d) falling, alter payment of a clarm, to mform 
msureds or benefic1anes. upon request by them, 
of the coverage under wh1ch payment was made; 
(e) fmlmg to promptly provrde to the msured a 
reasonable explanatiOn of the basiS for demal of a 
cl.um or for the offer of a compromise settlement, 
<D appealmg from substantially all arbitratwn 
awards m favor of msureds for the purpose of 
compelling them to accept settlements or compro-
mises for less than the amount awarded m arbi-
trJtwn 
(g) delaymg the tm esttgatwn or payment of 
clmms by reqmnng an msured, cla1mant, or the 
phystctan of etther to submtt a prehmmary clatm 
report and then reqmrmg the subsequent sub-
m!sston of formal proof of loss forms wh1ch con-
tam substantially the same mformatwn, or 
(h) not attemptmg m good fa1th to effectuate a 
prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of claims 
m whtch hab1hty 1s reasonably clear 
(4) The commtsswner rna\' define by rule, acts or 
general bus mess practices which are unfair claim set-
tlement pract1ces, after a findmg that those pract1ces 
are mtsleadmg, decepttve unfatrly d1scnmmatory, 
overreachmg, or an unreasonable restramt on compe-
titiOn 
(5) Thts sectwn does not create any pnvate cause 
of actwn 1987 
31A-26-304. ProhibitiOn of confltctmg roles. 
A person hcensed concurrently as both an mdepen 
dent and a pubhc adJuster mav not represent both the 
msurer and the msured m the same tran<;actwn 
1985 
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November 1, 1989 
Metropolitan Property and 
Liability Insurance Company 
P. 0. Box 675 
Warwick, RI 02887 
Re: Your Claim Number: DK300468RA 
Your Insured: Richard Nielsen 
Our Client: Richard Nielsen 
Date of Loss: 04/23/83 
Dear Mr. Ganci: 
E. R CHRISTENSEN 
(1886. 1979) 
OF' COUNSEL 
CRAIG V. WENTztt 
ABA NET 10: ABA 17916 
•AlSO liCE:NS£0 IN WASH •• O C. AND COI..ORAOO 
"•ALSO UCENS£0 IN CAI.If'OANIA 
tALSO LICE:NSEO IN ARIZONA 
ffALSO I,.ICENS£0 IN WASHit.IGTON STAT£ 
tTTAt.SO LICENSED IN TEXAS 
This letter will serve to confirm and reply to the 
telephone call to me initiated by you on October 18, 1989. 
You apparently initiated the call to discuss the 
possibilities of negotiating a compromise settlement. You 
indicated that a compromise from $250,000 to $225,000 on the part 
of the plaintiff was not much in the spirit of compromise and 
indicated that Mr. Nielsen should further substantially 
compromise his claim in order to reach a settlement and avoid the 
expenses of trial. As support for your position, you stated that 
you had had independent counsel review the file and they 
determined that the value of the case was less than $100,000. 
You further indicated that numerous attorneys had reviewed the 
file and all of them had found the value less than $100,000. I 
challenged the evaluations upon the grounds that it was apparent 
the attorneys (who you would not identify) did not have all of 
the facts in order to properly evaluate the case. I further 
indicated that I had discussed the case with other attorneys in 
our office, all of whom do insurance defense work, and it was our 
opinion that the case had value of at least $25Q, 000, if not 
more. 
In any event, I confirmed that the only offer that 
Metropolitan had made was $60,000, which was not even equal to 
the special damages (including pre-judgment interest). You 
requested that Mr. Nielsen come down from his past demand of 
CHRISTENSEN, ,JENSEN & POWELL 
Jim Ganci 
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$225,000, and I reported to you that the $225,000 offer was in 
response to what we thought was an offer by Metropolitan in the 
amount of $125,000. Since Thomas Beckman indicated that $125,000 
was not an offer, it appears that Mr. Nielsen was the only one 
attempting to negotiate a settlement. I further note that 
plaintiff withdrew his offer to settle for $225,000 in my letter 
to Barbara Maw dated June 13, 1989, a copy of which I enclose for 
your reference. The only amount Metropolitan had offered was the 
$60,000 (the previous offer). I then indicated to you that if 
Metropolitan desired to respond to our offer, it was free to do 
so, however, we were not going to continue to negotiate on that 
basis. You then made a firm offer of $150, 000, which you 
expressly confirmed to be a "real offer" and not just a 
"recommendation to the company." 
As I told you over the phone, given the facts of this 
case (as outlined in my previous correspondence and plaintiff's 
answers to discovery) , we are firmly convinced that this case has 
value in excess of $250,000, and that Metropolitan in good faith 
should tender its limits to Mr. Nielsen. The efforts on the part 
of Mr. Nielsen to negotiate a compromise settlement was to avoid 
the continued expense, delay and mental stress associated with 
litigation. In light of what has happened, Mr. Nielsen is 
currently contemplating whether he should again consider a 
compromise offer or reaffirm his demand for the policy limits. 
However, before Mr. Nielsen wishes to formally respond to your 
offer, we desire to review the report- from Dr. Weight regarding 
the independent medical evaluation. By copy of this letter, I am 
requesting that Barbara Maw forward to me a copy of said report 
if received, and if not, encourage Dr. Weight to prepare this 
report as soon as possible. We may wish to depose Dr. Weight, 
depending upon his opinions. 
I reaffirm what I have expressed in prior 
communications. Mr. Nielsen has been seriously injured, with 
extensive injuries to numerous parts of his body, including his 
back. Dr. Lamb was clear that Mr. Nielsen faces future surgery, 
with all of its inherent risks. He has suffered brain damage 
which seriously effects his ability to interact with people and 
to maintain his profession as a teacher and coach. His family 
life has been seriously disrupted, and he has lost his ability to 
perform physical activities. His disabilities have reduced his 
income and he is unable to perform the kind of labor he was doing 
for gainful employment during the summers. The injuries have 
almost totally restricted his ability to perform sports, which 
has been the focus of his employment, hobbies and recreation. 
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It has now been seven years since the accident. I 
again urge that Metropolitan discontinue its efforts to force 
compromise by delay and further litigation and pay the fair value 
of this case. The evidence of Metropolitan's bad faith is 
abundant and more than ample to justify a bad faith action 
following the conclusion of the present case. I am uncertain how 
much longer Mr. Nielsen will be willing to consider a compromise 
offer before totally withdrawing any offer and insisting that 
Metropolitan pay the full amount of the policy limits, which this 
case is worth. He is still hopeful that we can resolve this 
matter without the mental trauma of a trial, however, he is 
resolved that if Metropolitan refuses to pay the fair value for 
his claim, that he will see the matter through to the end, 
including a bad faith action. As your defense counsel will tell 
you, I have successfully prosecuted bad faith claims and will not 
hesitate recommending the same to Mr. Nielsen. One of my 
specialties is insurance bad faith law. I have handled numerous 
bad faith cases· not only in behalf of many insurance companies 
that I routinely represent, but I have also aggressively pursued 
claims against other insurance companies where the bad faith is 
obvious and egregious, which I believe is the case here. 
I will report back to you how Mr. 
respond to your offer as soon as I have 
requested information. 
Nielsen desires to 
received the above 
I have been advised by co-counsel, Ron Schiess, that 
you have attempted to contact him directly, despite our last 
telephone conversation and the fact that I am primary counsel. 
Please consider this his response to your telephone messages, and 
from this time forward, please direct all of your communications 
as it pertains to this case through me. 
LRH:pkc 
cc: Ron Schiess 
Bob Cummings 
Richard Nielsen 
Barbara Maw'--.-/' 
Very truly, 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By: 
----~--------------------------------L. Rich Humpherys 
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Metropolitan Property and 
Liability Insurance Company 
P.O. Box 675 
Warwick, RI 02887 
Re: Your Claim Number: DK300468RA 
Your Insured: Richard Nielsen 
Date of Loss: 04/23/83 
Dear Mr. Ganci: 
E R CHRISTENSEN 
(1886- 1979) 
OF" COUNSEL 
CRAIG V. WENTZ11 
ABA NET 10: ABA 17916 
"AlSO LIC£NSEO IN W,_SH ,0 C AND COLORADO 
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I have now had the opportunity to examine Dr. Weight's 
report and discuss the same with my client. Though Dr. Weight is 
unwilling to acknowledge brain damage, he confirms the problems 
that Mr. Nielsen is having and simply attributes them to 
psychological origin. In so doing, he draws various assumptions 
and conclusions which are not well founded in the evidence. In any 
event, Dr. Weight is willing to admit that regardless of the 
source, Mr. Nielsen's problems are clearly precipitated and largely 
resulting from the injuries from the accident. He further confirms 
the need for future therapy which Dr. Nilsson is also recommending, 
though from a different perspective. Whether brain damage or 
psychological (or a combination of both) the effect on Mr. Nielsen 
and his family's life are the same. 
We appreciate your letter of November 14, giving us until 
December 15 to respond to your company's offer of $150,000. After 
serious consideration of the offer and a thorough review of the 
case, Mr. Nielsen cannot accept your offer. A few weeks ago I 
discussed with your counsel, Barbara Maw, that Mr. Nielsen would 
be willing to settle his U .M. claim for an amount less than 
$250,000, reserving all other claims against Metropolitan, 
including bad faith. She stated rather emphatically that 
Metropolitan would be unwilling to consider an offer that would not 
fully resolve all claims between the parties. Based upon this 
discussion, I assume that your offer of $150,000 is contingent upon 
Mr. Nielsen releasing all claims, including bad faith, in turn 
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for the acceptance of said offer. If such is not the case, please 
contact me. Should Metropolitan desire to reconsider this posit1on 
and extend an offer to settle the pending litigation (only the U.M. 
claim), please let me know. 
LRHjjc 
cc: Barbara Maw 
/' 
Ronald G. Schiess 
Robert c. Cummins 
Richard Nielsen 
Very truly, 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By: 
L. Rich Humpherys 
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January 3, 1990 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Nielsen v. O'Reilly 
Dear Glen and Barbara: 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN 
(1886- 1979) 
OF COUNSEL 
CRAIG V. WENTZ'' 
ABA NET ID: ABA 17916 
•AlSO LICENSED IN WASH., D.C. AND COLORADO 
-.. .. ALSO LICEHSED IN CAllfOfHUA 
tALSO LICENSED IN ARIZONA 
'ttA.lSO t.ICENSEO IN WASHINGTON STillE 
ttt ALSO LICENSED IN TEXAS 
This will confirm our conversation during the week of 
December 18, wherein Glen indicated that Metropolitan was willing 
to negotiate above the figure of $150,000, however, if the 
plaintiff were unwilling to settle for an amount less than 
$200,000, there would be no need to further negotiate. I indicated 
that the plaintiff's current demand is $250,000 and it therefore 
did not appear that this case would settle in light of what Glen 
said. 
I then asked if Metropolitan were offering any amount in 
settlement of the UM claim only and Glen indicated not at this time 
and that the present outstanding offer related to a settlement of 
all claims, not just the UM claim. 
I again urge that Metropolitan reconsider this position 
and negotiate the UM claim. 
LRHjjc 
cc: Richard Nielsen 
Robert c. Cummings 
Ronald G. Schiess 
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I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated January 9, 
indicating that Metro rejects plaintiff's demand for $250,000 to 
settle "this matter." In addition; Metropolitan extends an offer 
of $150,000 in "full, final and complete settlement of this 
matter." You clarified in a telephone conversation today that 
"this matter" means all possible claims between Richard Nielsen and 
Metropolitan, including potential bad faith claims that are not yet 
filed. You verified that there is no offer by Metropolitan to 
settle just the U.M. claim. 
I again urge that Metropolitan fulfill its good faith 
duties to its insured by negotiating and offering an amount for 
the U.M. claim and cease trying to force Mr. Nielsen to give up 
other possible claims in order to settle the U.M. claim (which is 
not just "reasonably clear" but is a certainty, with only the 
amount of the U.M. claim at issue). 
Please contact me immediately should Metropolitan be 
willing to negotiate the U .M. claim without the condition of a 
release of all other claims. 
Very truly, 
LRH/jc 
P.S. Pursuant to your request, I enclose a copy of the report from 
Dr. Thomas that I just received. 
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Re: Nielsen v. O'Reilly 
Dear Glenn and Barbara: 
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I enclose a proposed judgment against defendants 0 'Reilly 
and French for your review. If there are no problems, I would 
appreciate one of you signing, approving as to form and returning 
the same to me as soon as convenient. If there is a problem, 
please contact me immediately. 
I have not submitted a proposed judgment against 
Metropolitan. I understand that Metropolitan has paid some amount 
which it claims to be advanced payments under the UM coverage. I 
have requested a copy of any documents verifying such advance 
payments so I can address the same with my client. I have also 
requested a complete copy of all no-fault payments to insure that 
everything is properly accounted for. 
In reviewing the policy again and in performing some 
additional legal research, there are a line of cases which would 
support a position that Metropolitan is liable up to $500,000. 
This position is based upon the fact that there were two 
individuals (Richard Nielsen and his son) which were injured in the 
car, thereby triggering the "per accident" limit of $500,000. I 
enclose a copy of some cases which support our position on this 
issue. 
CHRISTENSEN. JENSEN & PowELL 
Glenn Hanni and Barbara Maw 
February 21, 1990 
Page 2 
I will prepare a proposed judgment again~- Metropolitan 
as soon as I have received your verifications .:.::erning any 
advanced paym~nts. In light of the plaint.iff' s prE:.c:.ent position 
concerning the higher policy limit, I would appreciate receiving 
all information concerning the payments to Richard Nielsen's son 
as well. 
LRHjjc 
cc: Richard Nielsen 
Ronald G. Schiess 
Robert c. Cummings 
Very truly, 
~I~ENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
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Re: Nielsen v. O'Reilly, Civ. No. C87-2288 
Dear Barbara: 
Pursuant to our discussion, I enclose an original and one copy 
of the Judgment against Defendant Metropolitan. I have eliminated 
the word "partial" and added the following language: 
"Nothing herein shall constitute 
waiver of any claim or defense by 
concerning any remaining issue." 
a bar or 
any party 
Please sign, approving as to form, and return as soon as 
possible. 
Very truly, 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
LRH/skg 
Enclosure 
